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ARE SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLS INHERENTLY 
UNEQUAL? 
Michael Heise* 
SAME, DIFFERENT, EQUAL: RETHINKING SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLING. 
By Rosemary C. Salomone. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2003. 
Pp. xv, 287. $29.95. 
INTRODUCTION 
In chess, a "fork" occurs when a player, in a single move, attacks 
two or more of an opponent's pieces simultaneously, forcing a 
necessary choice between unappealing outcomes. Similar to the 
potentially devastating chess move, single-sex public schooling forks 
many constitutionalists and feminists. Constitutionalists are forced to 
reexamine the "separate-but-equal" doctrine's efficacy, this time 
through the prism of gender. Although the doctrine - forged in the 
crucible of race and overcome in the monumental triumph we know as 
Brown v. Board of Education1 - rested dormant for generations, 
persistent (and increasing) single-sex education options are forciag 
scholars to rethink long-held assumptions about how to breathe new 
life into the equal educational opportunity doctrine. To some 
constitutionalists "separate" schools threaten to march girls back to 
the pre-Brown era and a gendered version of an educational Jim 
Crow. To others single-sex schools paradoxically enhance educational 
opportunity by affording more girls (or boys)2 the chance to achieve 
their full academic potential. 
The prospect of single-sex public schooling also forces many 
feminists to confront a similarly stark and uncomfortable choice 
between theoretical purity and intellectual honesty on the one hand 
and the more pragmatic educational needs of young girls -
* Professor, Cornell Law School. A.B., Stanford University; J.D., University of Chicago; 
Ph.D., Northwestern University. - Ed. Dawn Chutkow, Dan Cole, James E. Ryan, and 
Trevor Morrison provided helpful comments on earlier drafts. Reference librarians at 
Cornell Law School, Hayley E. Reynolds, and Amanda Meader provided excellent research 
assistance. 
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. Throughout this Review I use conventional education law terminology and refer to 
"girls" and "boys" when discussing elementary and secondary students. The terms "women" 
and "men" denote post-secondary students. 
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particularly low-income and minority girls - on the other. The mere 
idea of publicly supported single-sex schools strikes some feminists as 
anathema, which reflects an appalling retreat and the gender wars' 
unfinished business. Single-sex schools are especially painful for those 
women who still carry scars from the days when girls' educational 
interests were reflexively subordinated to boys' educational interests. 
After protracted and difficult battles and having finally established in 
1979 a statutory foothold in Title IX,3 the prospect of "going back" to 
state-sponsored de jure "girls-only" schools represents for many 
feminists an unfathomable retreat. Consequently, some feminists do 
not even blink at the necessity - however regrettable - of sacrificing 
the present educational needs of some girls - even girls from low­
income households ill-served by failing traditional coeducational 
public schools - on the altar of coeducation's theoretical purity. For 
these feminists, acknowledging possible differences between girls and 
boys and entertaining the prospect of single-sex public schools tailored 
to such differences would produce unacceptable political costs. For 
those reflexively opposed to single-sex schooling, emerging education 
data - however uncomfortable - are simply insufficient to trump 
ideological purity and consistency. For other feminists, however, 
coeducation's ideological purity and consistency gave way to a 
pragmatic assessment of girls' educational needs. These feminists have 
concluded that separatism is a small (indeed, perhaps, sometimes 
welcome) price for a focused educational program and that single-sex 
education can be structured in a manner that neither risks gender 
subordination nor perpetuates the "legal, social, or economic 
inferiority of women."4 
For constitutionalists and feminists the stakes posed by single-sex 
schools are high, the implications indelicate and uncomfortable. 
Opponents of single-sex schooling "remain transfixed in equality as 
sameness" (p. 63). In contrast, proponents "weave through the maze 
of sex differences, women's historical subordination, and inequalities 
based on race and class while struggling to avoid the deep and 
dangerous pitfalls of deficiency, essentialism, and categorical 
stereotypes" (p. 63). For those "forked" by the single-sex schooling 
issue none of the options looks especially appealing. Professor 
Rosemary C. Salomone's book, Same, Different, Equal: Rethinking 
Single-Sex Schooling,5 stands unblinking at the intersection where 
3. Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11 ,  1979) (codified at 45 C.F.R. 
pt. 86). 
4. Denise C. Morgan, Finding a Constitutionally Permissible Path to Sex Equality: The 
Young Women's Leadership School of East Harlem, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 95, 112 
(1998). 
5. Professor Salomone is the Kenneth Wang Professor at St. John's University School 
of Law. 
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these two competing visions collide. Salomone's analyses skillfully 
sketch the contours of options that flow from seemingly irreconcilable 
visions of gender and education that continue to define public and 
scholarly debates about single-sex schooling. 
Professor Salomone deserves praise for even approaching such 
contentious terrain. That she does so with intellectual rigor, honesty, 
and a healthy dose of scholarly discipline and distance warrants even 
more praise. What is clear from the book's opening paragraph is that 
Professor Salomone possesses a clear understanding of the larger 
social context that frequently frames complex legal and policy 
questions, such as the one posed by single-sex schooling. Salomone 
structures her treatment of single-sex schooling by juxtaposing two 
distinct - though, as Salomone notes, related - events that took 
place in the summer of 1996. First, the Supreme Court invalidated 
Virginia Military Institute's ("VMI") all-male admissions policy;6 
weeks later the New York City School Board announced plans to 
open the Young Women's Leadership School, a public all-girls middle 
school for low-income families in East Harlem (p. 1). Both events 
aptly reflect competing visions of single-sex education. But the 
Supreme Court's conclusion that the all-male "Rat Line"7 at VMI ran 
afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment casts a constitutional shadow 
over the effort to create an academic safe haven in East Harlem 
designed to provide an educational lifeline to low-income (and 
overwhelmingly minority) girls. Salomone's suggestion that these two 
events may be inextricably intertwined helps to uncover unsettling and 
shifting assumptions about gender, sex, race, education, and ideology. 
Two questions - one legal, the other policy - moor Professor 
Salomone's treatment of single-sex schooling. First, are public single­
sex schools constitutional? Second, what educational benefits (for girls 
or boys), if any, are attributable to single-sex schooling (pp. 5-6)? 
After surveying the relevant theoretical literatures, working through 
Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment, and exploring the available 
social-science evidence, Professor Salomone's analyses and arguments 
support the weight of her unambiguous conclusion: "[I]t defies reason 
for government to mandate coeducation for all students enrolled in 
public schools" (p. 243). 
Regardless of whether one agrees with Professor Salomone's 
conclusion, Same, Different, Equal succeeds on many levels. At a 
general level, Salomone's treatment of single-sex schooling 
6. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
7. By tradition, first-year students at VMI are referred to, informally, as "rats." The 
"Rat Line" narrowly refers to VMI first-year cadets standing at attention in formation as 
well as more broadly (and loosely) to a first-year cadet's total experience at VMI. See Scott 
M. Smiler, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Virginia Military Institute: A Culmination of 
Strategic Success, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 541, 560-61 (1998). 
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successfully straddles law and policy. This is a considerable 
accomplishment as such undertakings traditionally emphasize either 
law or policy or unfold in a schizophrenic manner. At a more specific 
level, her comprehensive treatment of single-sex schooling advances 
our understanding of the increasingly congested intersection of law 
and education policy. In so doing, the book achieves the more modest 
goals of tracking the equal educational opportunity doctrine's 
development and enhancing our understanding of the courts' role in 
promoting it. On the fiftieth anniversary of the Brown decision, calls 
for greater scholarly and public attention to equal educational 
opportunity - such as Salomone's - are particularly apt. In addition, 
those seeking to help schoolchildren obtain a better education will 
benefit greatly from an increased understanding of how law and policy 
interact in this important context. Given the recent increased interest 
in single-sex education,8 it is unlikely that those committed to greater 
educational equity will be able to ignore how education and gender 
intersect. Scholars and policymakers who engage with the single-sex­
schooling issue need to take account of Salomone's analyses. 
Within the single-sex education literature, Same, Different, Equal 
should serve as the reference point for the foreseeable future. This 
book is important not only for what it says, but for how it says it. As to 
the former, Part I of this Review explores how single-sex schooling 
forces constitutionalists and feminists to confront the complicated and 
dynamic equal educational opportunity doctrine. How Professor 
Salomone develops and structures her thesis is equally important, and 
Part II focuses on Salomone's use of social-science evidence to inform 
her legal analyses and drive her policy analyses. Perhaps unsettling to 
some, Salomone's use of social-scientific evidence - necessary for her 
policy arguments - arcs back to the Brown9 opinion and enhances our 
evolving understanding about what equal education means.10 Finally, 
Part III considers the possible future of single-sex schooling within the 
larger context of the evolving educational reform setting. 
8. For example, the National Association for Single Sex Public Education reports that in 
August 2003, six new single-gender schools opened their doors. See Single-Sex Public 
Schools in the United States, at http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools.htrnl (last visited 
Aug. 12, 2004). 
9. 347 U.S. at 494 n.11 .  
10. Compare Michael Heise, Equal Education by the Numbers: The Warren Court's 
Empirical Legacy, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1309 (2002) (arguing that the equal educational 
opportunity doctrine became increasingly empirical post-Brown) [hereinafter Heise, Equal 
Education by the Numbers], with James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science 
Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659 (2003) (arguing that the 
equal educational opportunity doctrine did not become increasingly empirical in post-Brown 
desegregation cases) [hereinafter Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence]. 
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I. UNCOMFORTABLE FORKS 
A. Constitutionalists 
The Brown decision and its proclamation that "separate is 
inherently unequal" rightly animate constitutionalists. Brown also 
fuels opposition to single-sex schooling, shapes its legal analysis, and 
profoundly informs educational policy across the country. Although 
Brown has not been interpreted to preclude single-sex schooling 
options, the decision contributes to "a roller-coaster ride of aborted 
starts and veiled attempts" (p. 117). Single-sex schooling directly 
confronts Brown's core tenant. The long shadow cast by Brown makes 
many recoil from contemplating anything remotely resembling 
separate but equal. Insofar as Brown is one of the most important 
legal decisions of the twentieth century,11 inevitable discomfort flows 
from reopening discussions of whether "separate" can indeed be 
"equal" in a manner that comports with Brown's dictates.12 
Although the application of Brown's logic to single-sex schooling 
- the potential constitutional transitivity of race and gender -
possesses obvious and intuitive appeal, Salomone devotes 
considerable effort to illustrating how the analogy itself is limited (p. 
119). Antidiscrimination and antisubordination principles make 
Brown relevant to the single-sex schooling issue, and both principles 
resonate deeply with women's past treatment in the education arena. 
To assess competently the constitutional efficacy of today's single-sex 
schools, however, Salomone urges that we "disengage" from past 
indignities and come to terms with both the subtle nuances and the 
sharp distinctions between then and now (p. 119). Although ever 
11. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN v. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 3, 8, 12 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001). 
12. To be sure, Salomone is not the first to take up the constitutional question raised by 
public single-sex schooling. Indeed, the VMI decision spurred a growing discussion in the 
literature. See generally Kristin S. Caplice, The Case for Public Single-Sex Education, 18  
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 227 (1994-1995) (advocating for single-sex education); William 
Henry Hurd, Gone With the Wind?, VM/'s Loss and the Future of Single-Sex Education, 4 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 27 (1997) (arguing for greater constitutional accommodation 
of single-sex schools); Denise C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis after United States v. 
Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 381, 384 (1999) (identifying the circumstances that might help single-sex schools 
survive constitutional scrutiny); Amy H. Nemko, Single-Sex Public Education After VMI: 
The Case for Women's Schools, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19 (1998) (arguing for greater 
constitutional accommodation of single-sex schools); Carolyn B. Ramsey, Subtracting Sexism 
from the Classroom: Law and Policy in the Debate Over All-Female Math and Science 
Classes in Public Schools, 8 TEXAS J. WOMEN & L. 1 (1998) (arguing that all-girl math and 
science classes do not necessarily violate the Fourteenth Amendment); Valorie K. Vojdik, 
Girls' Schools After VMI: Do They Make the Grade?, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 69 
(1997) (arguing that all-girls schools are unconstitutional); Verna L. Williams, Reform or 
Retrenchment: Single-Sex Education and the Construction of Race and Gender, 2004 WIS. L. 
REV. 15 (2004) (arguing that single-sex schooling is unconstitutional in part due to its 
intersection with race). 
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mindful of the past, Salomone asks readers to look forward where, 
according to Salomone, the constitutional view differs. 
Salomone distinguishes between past and present single-sex 
schooling. In the current context, attendance in single-sex schools is 
voluntary, and coeducational options remain, if not predominate. 
Salomone also outlines "fundamental differences" between race 
and sex and correctly notes that the Court recognizes such differences 
by imposing a less onerous standard of judicial review upon sex-based 
classifications (pp. 120-21). Finally, and most importantly, Salomone 
inverts the Brown-based constitutional critique of single-sex schooling 
by arguing that the current push for single-sex schools (unlike many 
past campaigns) endeavors to fulfill - indeed, perhaps, to enhance -
the promise for equal educational opportunity articulated in Brown 
(p. 120). To be sure, the argument that Brown can be honored by 
"separate but equal" is a complicated and deep constitutional paradox 
fraught with peril. But notwithstanding the peril, in a dramatic twist 
loaded with irony, Salomone urges that in the education context, as it 
relates to gender, separate can be inherently equal. It is difficult to 
overemphasize the complexity and force of this rhetorical inversion. 
Her case studies describing the legal fights over single-sex schooling in 
Philadelphia and Detroit make these difficulties painfully clear 
(Chapter Six). In the end, Professor Salomone, as mindful as anyone 
of the associated risks, is prepared to depart from the past, look anew, 
and embrace such a paradox. Opponents of single-sex schooling will 
not or can not do the same.13 
B. Feminists 
If constitutionalists find the single-sex schooling issue 
uncomfortable, many feminists find it downright painful. Feminists 
coalesced around the legal assault against the previously all-male 
publicly-funded Virginia Military Institute. The multiyear effort 
consumed substantial time, effort, resources, and energy. In the main, 
these feminists managed to maintain a strong facade of repulsion 
against the single-sex admissions policy. Their effort culminated in 
June 1996 when the Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice 
Ginsburg, one of feminisms' "own,"14 struck down VMl's single-sex 
admissions policy as contrary to constitutional requirements.15 The 
Court's sweeping United States v. Virginia ("VMI") decision endures 
13. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 12. 
14. See, e.g., Carol Pressman, The House That Ruth Built: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Gender and Justice, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 311, 314-15 (1997-1998) (discussing Justice 
Ginsburg's crusade against gender discrimination, especially in her capacity as co-director of 
the ACLU Women's Rights Project). 
15. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
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as a rallying cry for feminists and the quest for gender equity in 
education. 
Several weeks later, the loud, public feminist rallying cry turned to 
audible gasps and groans as the nation's media turned its attention to 
a decision by the New York public school district to launch a public 
all-girls middle school for inner-city minority students.16 Almost 
instantly, parents in East Harlem busily prepared their daughters for 
an opportunity at an educationally liberating environment - one 
previously preserved for those wealthy enough to afford private school 
tuition. At the same time, some feminists, fresh from their passionate 
and successful assault against VMI's all-male policies, regrouped to 
support a single-sex school designed to help girls. In contrast, many 
feminist organizations as well as organizations sympathetic to 
mainstream feminist positions (including the National Organization 
for Women and the American Civil Liberties Union) condemned all­
girls schools just as ferociously as they opposed all-boys schools. The 
feminist coalition, publicly united in its successful campaign to 
extinguish VMI's all-male heritage, began to implode when 
confronted with an education initiative seeking to serve traditionally 
underserved minority girls. Feminists suddenly realized that if their 
fight against VMI resembled the "Great War," their subsequent fight 
against East Harlem's all-girls school resembled Vietnam. 
The traditional feminist and liberal coalitions split from the start. 
Long-assumed lines frayed; alliances dissolved. Leading progressive 
icons rebuked what they perceived to be a reflexive assault on single­
sex education. Those who for decades fought side-by-side on behalf of 
sex equality now face off against one another in legal and policy 
squabbles (p. 39). Professor Derrick Bell - whose liberal credentials 
remain above reproach - symbolizes this dissonance. In a widely 
noted essay published on the opinion page of the New York Times, 
Professor Bell chided the ACLU for their "war against [the] girls' 
school in Harlem."17 With his especially acute sense of constitutional 
history in general and the equal educational opportunity doctrine in 
particular, Professor Bell's impression that the NOW and the ACLU's 
interpretation of constitutional requirements ran directly against the 
needs of poor minority children gained particular attention. Bell also 
invoked the haunting mixed legacy of the school desegregation effort 
by noting that even successful lawsuits with the best of intentions can 
sometimes "do no more than maint.ain a woeful status quo."18 
16. See Sarah Kershaw, Feds Set to Approve All-Girl Academy, NEWSDA Y, Feb. 12, 
1998, at A29. 
17. Derrick Bell, Et Tu, A.CL. U.?, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1996, at A23. 
18. Id. Professor Bell's complex and nuanced views on race in general and school 
desegregation in particular resist facile description. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE 
NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 108-09 (1987) (considering 
1226 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:1219 
Critical changes in single-sex schooling are one source of the 
fracture in the traditional feminist movement.19 Where single-sex 
schooling in the past typically worked to the disadvantage of girls and 
women, some single-sex schooling options now stand to benefit them. 
Thus, as Salomone correctly points out, feminists' historic posture has 
been turned "inside out" (p. 150). Traditionally - and h.istorically -
women and girls were on the outside seeking entry into educational 
institutions. Consequently, admission into schools previously reserved 
for men and boys was correctly viewed as an integral part of securing 
broader equality of opportunity. Indeed, many viewed full equal 
access to education as an essential element of women's equality. The 
ultimately successful VMI litigation, and the end of that school's long 
history of exclusively male privilege, provided a visceral bridge to 
women's past efforts at securing equal rights and educational 
opportunity. 
If VMI aptly symbolized women's educational suffrage of the past, 
the Young Women's Leadership School in East Harlem symbolizes its 
future. The Young Women's Leadership School embodies an 
emerging perspective shared by a growing number of feminists, 
especially second- and third-generation feminists. The disputes about 
VMI and the Young Women's Leadership School force us to consider 
whether the formal equity of coeducation advances or, paradoxically, 
limits women's quest for realizing greater equality in education (p. 53). 
Salomone and other single-sex school supporters share a conviction 
that single-sex education - especially for girls and low-income 
families - is now essential as a remedy for unequal education. 
C. The Peculiar (and Evolving) Role of Justice Ginsburg 
Justice Ginsburg's important and unique role in shaping the legal 
framework for sex discrimination informs single-gender education as 
well as straddles an emerging generational "divide" that is beginning 
to distinguish emerging feminists from their foremothers. Indeed, 
Justice Ginsburg's personal history supplies essential context. Given 
Justice Ginsburg's biography, it is difficult to imagine a person better 
alternative motives for the Brown decision); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF 
THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 104 (1992) (discussing possible unintended 
consequences of the Brown decision). 
19. Numerous other factors contributed to the splintering of the traditional feminist 
coalition on the issue of single-sex schooling. Regrettably, Professor Salomone does not 
delve into other factors with the same rigor as she devotes to single-sex schooling. To be fair, 
although single-sex schooling and feminist theory inevitably intersect, Professor Salomone 
sought to analyze the former and not the latter, formally anyway. It would strike me as 
unfair to criticize a book for what it did not undertake as opposed to dwelling on what it did 
undertake. For those interested in pursuing a more detailed analysis of intrafeminist fighting, 
see, for example, NANCY LEVIT, THE GENDER LINE: MEN, WOMEN, AND THE LAW 153-67 
(1998). 
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positioned to embody the rich complexity that characterizes the single­
sex schooling issue. And to the extent that the warring factions within 
the feminist community share any common ground - and this is a big 
if - the broad intellectual terrain marked by Justice Ginsburg's vision 
might define it. 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg graduated at the top of her high school class 
and with high honors from Cornell University. Two years after 
graduating from Cornell she entered Harvard Law School. After her 
second year (and earning an offer to join the Harvard Law Review) 
she transferred to Columbia Law School incident to her husband 
accepting a position with a New York City law firm. Ginsburg 
petitioned Harvard Law School for a law degree pending the 
successful completion of her third year of legal studies at Columbia. 
However, although law schools routinely permit students to undertake 
their final year of law school at a "commensurate" or "peer" 
institution and receive a diploma from the law school where they 
began and completed two of the required three years course of study, 
Harvard Law School declined to extend Ginsburg such a courtesy.20 
Consequently, she completed her legal training at and received her 
law school diploma from Columbia.21 
Following law school graduation, Ginsburg served as a law clerk to 
District Court Judge Edmund Palmieri. In 1963 Ginsburg began 
teaching at Rutgers Law School and launched a successful academic 
career. During her stint at Rutgers, then-professor Ginsburg became 
involved with the ACLU New Jersey affiliate. Soon thereafter she 
founded and codirected the ACLU Women's Rights Project. In 1972, 
Ginsburg departed Rutgers and returned to Columbia as the first 
female tenured member of its law faculty. She joined the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1980 and, in 1993, was 
elevated to the United States Supreme Court. 
During the 1970s Ginsburg quickly earned a reputation as one of 
the nation's leading women's rights litigators. She argued numerous 
20. See Gerald Gunther, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Personal, Very Fond Tribute, 20 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 583, 583 (1998) (noting that Harvard Law School denied Ginsburg's petition 
even though similar petitions by men were "quite frequently granted"); see also Herma H. 
Kay, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Professor of Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2, 9 (2004) (same). 
21 .  At Columbia Law School, Ginsburg shared the top graduating spot with one other 
student. This vignette did not end with her graduation from Columbia, however. Years later 
Harvard Law School, (correctly) sensing a lapse in its institutional judgment by previously 
declining to permit Justice Ginsburg the honor of joining its roll of alumnae, endeavored to 
"fix" the situation in 1972 when it invited Justice Ginsburg to exercise the option of 
receiving a formal Harvard Law School degree. By that time Justice Ginsburg was well into 
her academic career and work litigating gender discrimination claims with the ACLU and, in 
particular, its Women's Rights Law Project. Justice Ginsburg declined Harvard Law 
School's invitation and remains a full alumna of the Columbia Law School. For a full 
discussion, see ELEANOR H. A YER, RUTH BADER GINSBURG: FIRE AND STEEL ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 31 (1994). 
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path-breaking cases venturing into new terrain, carved new law in the 
civil rights area, and litigated many of the era's leading gender 
discrimination cases.22 Notable was Ginsburg's work on the 
Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia23 case. 
In Vorchheimer, a girl was denied admission to Philadelphia's 
prestigious Central High School for Boys solely on the basis of her 
gender. The applicant, Susan Vorchheimer, confronted the argument 
that her access to either coeducational schools or the Philadelphia 
High School for Girls satisfied the school district's statutory and 
constitutional requirements. Simply put, Philadelphia advanced a 
"separate-but-equal" theory. Although the academically able 
applicant prevailed at the district court level, an underdeveloped 
("paltry," according to Salomone) trial record hamstrung her case at 
the court of appeals (p. 123). The Third Circuit concluded that the 
plaintiff's access to a public single-sex option, though not the precise 
single-sex option that the plaintiff preferred, conferred an "equal 
benefit and not discriminatory denial. "24 
As the Vorchheimer case progressed to the Supreme Court, the 
ACLU's Ruth Bader Ginsburg took the lead in crafting the certiorari 
petition. The petition advanced the strong form of the Brown 
doctrine: in the education context, separate is inherently unequal for 
gender, just as it is for race (p. 123). In reaching that conclusion, the 
ACLU petition drew extensively from sociological work by Professors 
Jencks and Riesman. In their work on all-male colleges, Professors 
Jencks and Riesman noted that it would be easier to defend all-male 
colleges had they emerged from a society where women were co­
equals with men. But, in the context of a male-dominant society, the 
researchers concluded that all-male colleges implicitly or explicitly 
reinforce assumptions about male superiority - "assumptions for 
which women must eventually pay" (p. 123). 
Twenty years later, in VMI, Justice Ginsburg again had occasion to 
engage with and reshape the legal analysis of single-sex education. 
Factual similarities linked the two cases. Similar to Philadelphia's 
Central High School for Boys, VMl's all-male admissions posture was 
a relic of a past era when society considered women unfit for higher 
22. During the 1970s Justice Ginsburg argued seven cases in front of the Supreme 
Court, losing only one. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 
U.S. 199 (1977); Edwards v. Healy, 421 U.S. 772 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 
636 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (lost); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 
(1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
23. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976) (No. 75-2005), affd 
by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977). 
24. P. 122; see Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 887-88. Indeed, the Philadelphia High School 
for Girls, established in 1848, enrolls almost 1 ,500 girls and is the largest single-sex public 
school in the United States. 
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education as well as military service. Eerily parallel to Philadelphia's 
Girl's High, VMI, in light of mounting legal pressure, invested 
considerable resources for the development of a "separate-but-equal" 
program for women, located at nearby Mary Baldwin College. What 
became manifestly clear during trial, however, was that the separate 
program at Mary Baldwin College "scarcely" resembled what VMI 
offered to its male students and, therefore, was hardly equal (p. 157). 
Despite similar cases, Justice Ginsburg advanced a slightly 
different position on single-sex education. In contrast to the "separate 
is inherently unequal" position Ginsburg advanced as a litigant on 
behalf of her client in Vorchheimer, the position she crafted in her 
capacity as an Associate Justice for the Court in VMI does not 
expressly preclude gender separatism in education. The formal test 
articulated in VMI imposes upon state uses of gender classification 
"skeptical" judicial scrutiny. Specifically, gender classifications must 
be "substantially related" to an "important" governmental interest 
and supported by an "exceedingly persuasive justification. "25 Of 
particular import is that any sex classification not rest upon "fixed 
notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females."26 
The onus upon state sex classifications in the education setting is 
quite severe (just how severe remains to be seen), and Justice 
Ginsburg's VMI opinion contributes to the severity. That said, the 
legal analysis in the VMI decision conveys a desire to cautiously 
navigate constitutional doctrine between competing visions of sex 
equality or equal treatment. Unlike race, the Court in VMI declared 
that "the inherent differences between men and women" are "cause 
for celebration," but not for the denial of equal opportunity.27 Unlike 
her position two decades earlier in Vorchheimer, in VMI Justice 
Ginsburg appears intellectually open to the possibility that a public 
single-sex school can pass constitutional muster. Indeed, conspicuously 
absent from the Court's VMI opinion is any reference to Brown. The 
analytical trick, as Professor Cass Sunstein notes, is to prevent 
instances where different treatment transforms gender differences into 
disadvantages. 28 
That Justice Ginsburg wrote the Court's opinion in VMI teems 
with irony. Indeed, neither the history nor irony of the moment were 
lost on Justice Ginsburg as she remarked that the decision was like 
"winning the Vorchheimer case twenty years later" (p. 165). Then 
Georgetown Law School Dean Mark Tushnet noted that, for Justice 
25. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524, 531 (1996). 
26. Id. at 541 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)) .  
27. Virginia, 518 U.S. at  533-34 (internal quotations omitted). 
28. CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 165 (1999). 
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Ginsburg, the VMI decision was one she had hoped the Court would 
one day arrive at when she began generating the legal precedent 
decades earlier (p. 165). 
Irony aside, what accounts for Justice Ginsburg's almost 
Solomonic desire to strike down VMl's all-male policies yet preserve 
the constitutional possibility of single-sex schooling? Moreover, what 
explains Justice Ginsburg's varying views about the constitutionality 
of single-sex public schooling? The variation - however slight -
disgruntled some of Justice Ginsburg's feminist allies.29 First, the 
decidedly different roles that Justice Ginsburg played in the 
Vorchheimer and VMI litigation possess important explanatory value. 
In her capacity as an attorney zealously representing her client's legal 
interests in Vorchheimer, Justice Ginsburg's position that separate is 
inherently unequal makes obvious sense. In contrast, Justice 
Ginsburg's role in VMI, an Associate Justice seeking to craft an 
opinion that garnered as many votes as possible, might help explain 
her unwillingness to preclude the constitutional possibility of single­
sex schooling. 
Second, Justice Ginsburg's personal history provides additional 
clues. On the one hand, it is hardly surprising that Justice Ginsburg 
would side with the Court's majority and conclude that VMl's male­
only admissions policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Having 
confronted - and overcome - significant gender-related barriers 
throughout her professional life, Justice Ginsburg was especially well­
positioned to understand the plight of women pushing past gender 
stereotypes to achieve full equality and justice. 
Other aspects of Justice Ginsburg's personal history might explain 
why she did not stake out a stronger position - one articulated in 
Brown and echoed in Vorchheimer - concluding that separate is 
inherently unequal, as some feminists would urge.30 Although Justice 
Ginsburg is surely conscious of women's struggles with discrimination, 
she is also mindful of some of the benefits that single-sex education 
can provide. This is especially true as Justice Ginsburg educated her 
daughter at The Brearley School, an exclusive, private all-girls school 
in Manhattan.31 Therefore, it is perhaps less than surprising to find in 
the VMI opinion - albeit in dicta - support for the position, 
advanced by a group of women's colleges in an amicus brief, that the 
29. See, e.g., Carey Olney, Better Bitch Than Mouse: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Feminism, 
and VMI, 9 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 97, 146 (2000-2001) (noting that some scholars question 
whether Justice Ginsburg maximized her opportunity to advance gender equality through 
the VMI opinion). 
30. See LEVIT, supra note 19, at 86. 
31 .  Justice Ginsburg's daughter graduated from The Brearley School in 1973. 
Obviously, as a technical matter, The Brearley School's status as a private school 
distinguishes it from the publicly funded schools at issue in Vorchheimer and V MI. 
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Constitution has no quarrel with single-sex schools that "dissipate, 
rather than perpetuate, traditional gender classifications."32 
Third, it remains at least plausible that Justice Ginsburg has always 
been sympathetic to some forms of public single-sex education, for the 
reasons advanced by Salomone. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg's position 
may have evolved over time, just as women's status has evolved. From 
Justice Ginsburg's vantage point, perhaps the women's movement 
progressed enough during the twenty years between Vorchheimer and 
VMI that the threat posed by public single-sex schooling has 
diminished to the point where public single-sex schools like the Young 
Women's Leadership School in Harlem are positioned to advance 
rather than ossify gender stereotypes. If so, it is possible to reconcile 
her legal positions articulated in Vorchheimer and VMI and her 
support for private and presumed support for some forms of public 
single-sex schools. 
II. IS COED COEQUAL? THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 
Along with what Professor Salomone thinks about single-sex 
schooling, how she crafts her argument matters. Professor Salomone 
treats the single-sex schooling question on both normative and 
empirical grounds. With respect to the latter, she carefully and even­
handedly summarizes the present social-scientific research base 
(Chapter Eight). Professor Salomone is confident enough to point out 
where, as is frequently the case, the data are largely indeterminative. 
A. Empirical Ambiguity 
The empirical ambiguity on the question of determinants of 
student educational achievement in single-sex settings is unsurprising, 
certainly to those familiar with the relevant social science. Some of the 
ambiguity rests on the limitations of existing data. The data limits flow 
from two main sources. First, the underlying dependent variables of 
interest - student achievement in general and achievement variations 
between boys and girls in particular - are especially complex and 
difficult to measure. Efforts to measure student academic achievement 
have attracted significant and sustained attention from social 
scientists. Precisely what causes some students to perform well and 
others less well is endlessly debated in the literature. Amid this 
persistent debate, a few points of loose agreement have emerged. For 
example, most scholars agree that a student's socioeconomic status, as 
well as the socioeconomic status of the student's peers, influence 
32. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 n.7. 
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student academic achievement.33 Although there is also some 
agreement that good teachers, strong principals, small schools and 
class sizes, and parental involvement can enhance student 
achievement, the specific significance of these variables remains the 
subject of debate.34 Overlaid onto these specific areas of scholarly 
contest is the more general dispute of whether - and, if so, how -
gender might influence student achievement. 
A second distinct, though related, structural limitation relates to 
research design. Ideally, social-scientific protocol strives for double­
blind, random assignment of subjects into treatment and control 
groups.35 Such a standard is comparatively easier to achieve when the 
"subjects" are, say, chemicals and the experiments take place in a 
controlled laboratory setting. Education research, however, typically 
takes place outside of the confines of a sterile, dust-free laboratory 
and involves real people, not chemicals. A properly designed double­
blind study would result in exposing some students to inferior 
educational methods - even if, at the outset, researchers did not 
know which methods were inferior. Thus, most institutional review 
boards understandably frown upon proposed education research 
studies that seek to use traditional scientific methodological protocols. 
As a consequence, most education research is limited by virtue of 
drawing upon something less than the "gold standard" in terms of 
research design and methodology. 
Although Professor Salomone correctly emphasizes the limitations 
of existing data and difficulties in research designs seeking to generate 
useful data, several nuggets of clarity emerge. And while flashes of 
clarity can contribute to important insights, what to make of or do 
about the insights is not always clear. The following example 
explicates. 
For years policymakers tried to make sense of two disparate yet 
related threads of evidence relating to girls' and boys' test results. On 
the one hand, despite some variation between math and verbal scores, 
on average girls' overall mean test scores exceed those of boys. To be 
33. Professor James Coleman was the first to report this phenomenon in his influential 
1966 study for the (then) Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which has since 
become known simply as the Coleman Report. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL 
OPPORTUNITY 301-04 (1966). Scores of subsequent studies have confirmed Coleman's 
conclusion. For citations to the literature, see RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER 
Now: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 25-28 
(2001). 
34. For a further discussion of research on this point, see KAHLENBERG, supra note 33, 
at 86-90. 
35. See Jay P. Greene, The Surprising Consensus on School Choice, 144 PUB. INT. 19, 19 
(2001) (describing the aspirational "gold standard" research design for school choice 
studies). 
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more precise, the girls' advantage in verbal skills "substantially 
outstrips" the boys' advantage in math (p. 80). On the other hand, 
boys are far more likely than girls to achieve extraordinarily high test 
scores and boys outperform girls on most Advanced Placement tests. 
This anomaly fuels confusion about whether girls or boys (or, for that 
matter, both) are being "shortchanged" academically. 
Professor Salomone's discussion of recent empirical research on 
this puzzle in "Myths and Realities in the Gender Wars" {Chapter 
Four) uncovers a powerful explanation that will make sense to anyone 
with a passing familiarity of elementary statistics. Simply put, the key 
to unlocking the puzzle surrounding boys' and girls' achievement 
levels is to understand that the shapes of their distributions vary. 
Specifically, the distribution of boys' test scores display greater 
variability than girls' test scores (p. 80). Thus, if one envisions how the 
two differently shaped distribution curves overlap {the boys' 
achievement curve distributes flatter and wider; the girls' curve is 
taller and thinner), the seemingly puzzling outcome - girls possessing 
a higher overall mean while more boys end up at the upper (and 
lower) tail of the bell curve - makes sense. Why boys' and girls' 
distribution curves vary and, as a normative matter, what policy ought 
to do about it, if anything, although worthy questions, fall outside the 
scope of Salomone's book. Identifying and discussing such differences, 
however, and understanding what they might mean for single-sex 
schooling are central tasks that Salomone aptly undertakes. In the 
education context, where comparatively little is known to any degree 
of certainty, even small advances can yield important insights and 
gains. Indeed, even learning more about what might not be happening 
to girls and boys can add scholarly value. 
Another point of social-scientific clarity involves the generally 
accepted assertion that children attending schools with high 
concentrations of low-income students rarely perform as well 
academically as their middle-class counterparts.36 Tending to obscure 
this larger point are persistent (and growing) squabbles about who is 
"winning" and "losing" in the academic race between the sexes (p. 
114). Sex-specific student achievement differences defy simple 
answers. As well, any such sex differences in academic performance 
cut in different directions on a wide range of indicators and continue 
to evolve over time.37 Without denigrating the legitimacy and import 
of disputes about sex-specific student achievement differences, 
Salomone points out such disputes "pale in comparison" to the 
escalating academic catastrophe that presently envelopes far too many 
students from low-income households and neighborhoods (p. 114). 
36. See sources cited supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
37. See sources cited infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
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Notably not clear in the social-scientific literature, however, is 
whether single-sex schooling generates benefits and, if so, who reaps 
those benefits. 
B. Social Science's Role in Legal Analysis 
While Professor Salomone ably synthesizes the social-science 
evidence relating to single-sex schooling and Title IX and the 
Constitution, she also backs into a larger question: Namely, what is the 
proper role for social-science evidence in legal analysis? Such a 
question is neither new nor unimportant. Indeed, the current rise in 
the production of empirical legal research only enhances the 
question's timeliness. Its intellectual pedigree arcs back in time 
directly to another education law case, Brown v. Board of Education.38 
I have argued elsewhere that the Court's use of social-science 
evidence in the Brown decision - whether integral to the outcome or 
not - led to an increased empiricization of the judicial understanding 
of equal educational opportunity generally.39 Professor Salomone's 
treatment of the social-science evidence in the single-sex schooling 
context is consistent with my thesis. More importantly, Professor 
Salomone's book on single-sex schooling contributes to the emerging 
literature that contemplates new models of educational services' 
production and delivery.40 Of small regret is that Professor Salomone 
does not engage more directly with the largely normative question 
about whether and, if so, what type of role social-science evidence 
should play in the single-sex schooling debate.41 Of course, the very 
structure of Salomone's analysis prominently features relevant social­
science evidence, implicitly suggesting that Salomone perceives a role 
for empirical research in the related legal and statutory analyses. 
Salomone hopes to make legal scholars more sensitive to relevant 
social-science evidence. After all, the VMI decision makes clear that 
public schools seeking single-sex experiences need to articulate and 
defend an "exceedingly persuasive justification"42 to depart from the 
default constitutional presumption of coeducation. Such a legal 
38. 347 U.S. 383, 494 n.11 (1954). To be sure, courts' use of social-science evidence pre­
dates Brown. For a discussion, see generally PAUL L. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1972). 
39. See Heise, Equal Education by the Numbers, supra note 10, at 1310. But see Ryan, 
The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence, supra note 10 (arguing that social science 
evidence has not overly influenced school desegregation litigation). 
40. Existing research considers the equal educational opportunity question from such 
perspectives as school finance and choice. Emerging work in this genre evidences increased 
empirical sophistication. 
41. Then again, such a topic warrants a full-length book treatment on its own. 
42. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996). 
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standard essentially begs for empirical confirmation of single-sex 
education's asserted benefits. Empirical uncertainty hamstrings the 
single-sex school context, however, and Salomone acknowledges as 
much (p. 235). Amid this general ambiguity, Salomone cautiously 
advances three "reasonable and useful conclusions" (p. 235). First, 
schoolchildren are not harmed by single-sex schooling, especially as it 
would be volitional in any context contemplated by Salomone. 
Second, single-sex schooling fosters more positive student attitudes in 
a wider range of academic subjects. Third, where these benefits arise 
they disproportionately accrue to minority students. The private 
school market supplies another source of indirect evidence. 
Presumably tuition-paying families have concluded that private single­
sex schools generate real (or perceived) educational value. 
Having carved out a role for social-science evidence in legal 
analysis, the absence of definitive social-scientific answers (as opposed 
to "reasonable and useful conclusions") to key questions in the single­
sex-schooling context creates additional legal questions. One such 
question is which side of the debate should benefit from the residual 
uncertainty. Salomone implicitly grabs for the benefit of the doubt and 
implies that in the absence of any clear harms single-sex schooling 
experiments should be legally accommodated (p. 235). Moreover, it 
would be logically uncomfortable to preclude such experimentation -
experimentation necessary to generate the sought-after data - solely 
on the grounds that insufficient data exist. The benefit of the social­
scientific doubt could just as easily go the other direction, however, 
especially on matters as contentious as gender equity in education. 
More specifically, how a rebuttable presumption is loaded - how 
severe and in which direction - could prove enormously important, 
perhaps dispositive. Indeed, the social-scientific uncertainty all but 
ensures that the position assigned to the wrong side of the rebuttable 
presumption will lose. Thus, if single-sex schooling must affirmatively 
shoulder the evidentiary burden of establishing that equal educational 
opportunity is enhanced before single-sex schools are deemed 
constitutional, the evidentiary uncertainty likely precludes single-sex 
schools from surviving "skeptical scrutiny."43 In contrast, if opponents 
must demonstrate that single-sex schools degrade educational equity, 
single-sex schools will prevail. Regrettably, Salomone does not discuss 
the implications of the various ways courts might structure the 
placement of the evidentiary burden as fully as the topic warrants. 
43. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 530. 
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III. THE FUTURE OF SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLING 
Professor Salomone notes "growing popular support for single-sex 
schooling" despite an "overwhelming cultural preference for 
coeducation" (p. 237). As a consequence of enduring legal and social 
presumptions, proposals for single-sex schooling begin in a defensive 
posture. This is so even where too many traditional educational 
schools fail utterly in their duty to provide educational services. Such 
failures are more common in schools that serve low-income 
schoolchildren.44 The future of single-sex education will unfold within 
a larger context that evidences an enduring quest for greater 
educational opportunity. As well, factors internal and external to 
single-sex schooling will continue to shape its future. 
A Equal Educational Opportunity Doctrine in Context: From Race, 
to Resources, and to Gender 
The evolution of American education's "Holy Grail" - the equal 
educational opportunity doctrine - persists. It is a dynamic doctrine 
that has changed profoundly in the past decades. During these years, a 
focus on resources has displaced an initial focus on race as the equal 
educational opportunity doctrine's principal mooring.45 Though 
perhaps not by design, Equal, Same, Different makes a strong (albeit 
implicit) case that gender warrants a rightful place at the equal 
educational opportunity doctrine table. 
In Brown, a unanimous Supreme Court with nothing less than 
powerful elegance described providing education as a state and local 
government's most important function.46 Since then courts have 
consistently echoed a similar theme. Almost twenty years after Brown, 
the Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez47 
44. For a summary of data on educational outcomes, especially in schools that serve 
low-income and minority students, see James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political 
Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2102-08 (2002). 
45. For a fuller account of this point see Michael Heise, Choosing Equal Educational 
Opportunity: School Reform, Law, and Public Policy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1134-35 
(2001). 
46. 
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both 
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is 
required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument 
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any 
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education. 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 383, 493 (1954). 
47. 411 U.S. 1 (1972). 
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reaffirmed its "historic dedication to public education,"48 noting that 
" 'the grave significance of education both to the individual and to our 
society' cannot be doubted."49 Such sentiments are consistent with the 
Court's perception of widely shared public values: "American people 
have always regarded education and its acquisition of knowledge 
as matters of supreme importance."50 Indeed, the Court's recognition 
of such values emerges in many Court opinions, even some that 
predate Brown.51 
That said, a general judicial commitment to the equal educational 
opportunity project in earnest does not itself identify an organizing 
principle or unifying theme. Since the mid-twentieth century's civil 
rights movement, race provided the organizing principle. After Brown, 
many legal and policy discussions about equal educational opportunity 
have been shaped by the lens of race and expressed through school 
desegregation litigation.52 Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
overstate Brown's impact on our nation's schools,53 conventional 
wisdom today suggests that the importance of race in debates over 
educational reform is waning.54 The generation-long struggle either 
assigned to or assumed by the courts over what equal educational 
48. Id. at 30. 
49. Id. (citing Rodriguez v. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 283 (1971)). 
50. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). 
51. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
213 (1972) (majority opinion authored by Burger, C.J.), 237, 238-39 (White, J., concurring); 
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J.); McCullum v. Bd. of 
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925); Meyer, 262 U.S.  at 400. However, it  remains important to note that although the 
Court has repeatedly recognized education's key role in our society, the right to education 
has not been deemed fundamental by the Court for Equal Protection Clause purposes. See, 
e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30. But see id. at 98-110 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
52. The literature on equal educational opportunity and school desegregation, already 
considerable, continues to grow. See, e.g. ,  ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); COLEMAN, supra note 33; 
LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE 
AND THE SCHOOLS (1976); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN 
V. BOARD OF EDUCA TION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975); 
GARY ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus?: SEGREGATED SCHOOLS AND NATIONAL POLICY (1978); 
Paul Gerwitz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983). The fortieth anniversary of 
Brown gave rise to another round of scholarly attention. For special symposia law review 
issues, see, for example, 4 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. (1995); 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. (1995). 
53. For example, Professor Salomone characterizes the Brown decision as 
"cataclysmic." See ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW 3 (1986); 
cf. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? (1991). 
54. To be fair, important exceptions endure. For example, Professor Gary Orfield's 
work in the educational opportunity area retains a focus on race as well as, to a growing 
degree, ethnicity. See, e.g., http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/aboutus/bios/orfield. 
php (last accessed July 30, 2004) (recounting Orfield's major works). 
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opportunity means in terms of race has broadened to include other 
concerns and alternative organizing principles. 
During the past few decades, an emerging focus on resources and 
educational quality - as reflected by student and school achievement 
- has eclipsed the equal educational opportunity doctrine's prior 
focus on race. Two related though distinct factors help explain the 
equal educational opportunity doctrine's broadening to encompass 
more than race. One factor is the emergence of school finance 
litigation which began in earnest when many civil rights activists were 
growing increasingly frustrated with the slow and uneven pace of 
school desegregation efforts. Interestingly, like their school 
desegregation predecessors, school-finance activists advanced a tying 
strategy designed to enhance equal education. Whereas school 
desegregation activists would tie the fate of white and black students 
together by placing them in the same schools, school-finance activists 
sought to tie the fate of poor and wealthy public schools by striving for 
equal access to educational resources.55 Prior to 1989, litigants 
challenging school funding programs primarily sought greater 
equalization in per-pupil spending.56 Since 1989, however, adequacy­
based theories have displaced equity theories. Presently, most school­
finance litigants argue not that all students are entitled to equalized 
per-pupil spending, but rather, that all students deserve the funds 
necessary to support an adequate education.57 Not surprisingly, 
perhaps, the legal pursuit of educational opportunity by seeking to 
extract additional resources for schools from school-finance adequacy 
litigation is strikingly similar in form and structure to the earlier 
struggles over educational equity forged in terms of race.58 
A second factor is that a shift in the education reform movement 
broadened the equal educational opportunity doctrine's focus to 
include educational excellence and quality. Since the mid-1980s equal 
educational opportunity has increasingly been construed in terms of 
outputs (e.g., student and school academic achievement) rather than 
the traditional inputs (e.g., racial composition of schools and per-pupil 
spending). Much of the current shift is traceable to the 1983 
publication of the report, A Nation A t  Risk: The Imperative For 
55. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2059 & n.67. 
56. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 121-40 (1995); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School 
Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1 151,  
1 152-53 (1995). 
57. See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 268-69 (1999) 
(describing the shift in school finance litigation theory). 
58. See generally Michael Heise, The Courts vs. Educational Standards, 120 PUB. INT. 55 
(1995) (arguing that the legal construction of equal educational opportunity is in transition). 
For a helpful account of the shift in litigation focus from race to wealth for many civil rights 
organizations, see, for example, Enrich, supra note 56, at 122-28. 
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Educational Reform. 59 The report did not mince words when it came 
to describing the scope of the problem confronting American 
education: "[T]he educational foundations of our society are presently 
being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very 
future as a Nation and a people."60 The report immediately broadened 
subsequent education-policy reform initiatives' focus to include such 
issues as student and school accountability for increased academic 
success. In response, many states began the arduous process of 
launching efforts to articulate educational standards for their students 
and schools as well as assessment mechanisms designed to assess 
progress toward the articulated standards.61 As well, recent federal 
school reform activity evidences a similar shift. In 1994 President 
Clinton signed into law the "Goals 2000: Educate America Act,"62 
and, more recently, President Bush signed into law the "No Child Left 
Behind Act."63 Although some praise and others criticize these new 
federal forays into educational policymaking terrain, few dispute that 
they reflect a decidedly new and different posture for the federal 
government. 64 
B. The Increasing Relevance of Gender for Equal Educational 
Opportunity 
The reorientation of the equal educational opportunity doctrine's 
focus from inputs to outputs helped generate renewed attention to 
gender. The emerging transformation of gender's role within equal 
educational opportunity doctrine's evolution follows a well­
established path forged by both school desegregation and finance 
litigation and theory. Indeed, Salomone's insertion of gender into the 
equal educational opportunity mix due to the purported academic 
benefits from single-sex schooling both comports with and fuels a 
59. See NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE 
IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983) (hereinafter NATION AT RISK). 
60. Id. at 5. 
61. For a brief description of two states' efforts, see Michael Heise, The Courts, 
Educational Policy, and Unintended Consequences, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 633 
(2002) (describing New York and North Carolina's developments of education standards 
and assessments). 
62. Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (2000) 
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 5801 (2000)). 
63. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1001, 115 Stat. 1425 
(2001). 
64. See, e.g., Michael Heise, Goals 2000: Educate America Act: The Federalization and 
Legalization of Educational Policy, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (1994); James S. Liebman & 
Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act and the Post-Desegregation Civil 
Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703 (2003). 
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broadening of what the equal educational opportunity doctrine 
can mean. 
To be sure, gender and the equal educational opportunity doctrine 
are far from strangers. Since the 1970s gender has been at the 
forefront of those seeking greater educational opportunity for girls 
and women. As Salomone makes clear, initial legal assaults were 
typically cast in terms of demands for coeducation or, for already 
coeducational environments, greater resources for girls and women. 
The passage of Title IX and the VM/ decision reflect how gender­
equity orientation in education was pursued legally and evidence its 
process-based, inputs-oriented conception of equal education. 
Once formal access was secured in terms of process and inputs, 
new legal theories had to evolve to accomplish more subtle, though 
equally important, substantive objectives. Again, the school 
desegregation and finance litigation contexts supply helpful 
perspective. In the desegregation context, after Milliken v. Bradley65 
and in light of enduring racial residential segregation, courts 
increasingly turned more broadly to efforts designed to improve 
African American student achievement and away from the narrow 
perspective of increasing classroom integration.66 Similarly, school­
finance litigants witnessed a change from equity to adequacy theory.67 
Both contexts evidence an increased willingness to construe equal 
educational opportunity from the perspective of outputs, here, in 
terms of student academic achievement. Here, the public controversy 
surrounding New York City's Young Women's Leadership School in 
Harlem neatly captures an emerging perspective oriented around girls' 
academic success rather than access to coeducational opportunities. 
Thus, Salomone's juxtaposing of these two events (pp. 1-4) captures 
the book's themes: the concurrent evolution (and potential collision) 
of feminist theory and equal educational opportunity doctrine as well 
as these events' consequence. 
Although Salomone advocates something quite different from the 
traditional perspective of gender equity in the education setting -
single-sex schooling - she embeds her argument in a similarly 
evolving conception of equal educational opportunity grounds. Thus, 
decidedly unlike the feminists before her, who struggled for gender 
equity in education by ensuring mere access for girls and women to 
educational opportunities previously reserved for boys and men, 
65. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
66. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (holding that compensatory and 
remedial programs can be included as part of a court-ordered desegregation decree) 
[hereinafter Milliken II]; James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 432, 436-37 & n.18 (1999) (noting the substitution of money for an integrated 
educational environment facilitated by Milliken II). 
67. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
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Salomone argues for sex-exclusion rather than inclusion. Decidedly 
similar to equal educational opportunists before her, however, 
Salomone advances her argument in a deeper conception of the equal 
education doctrine. It goes without saying that many will not find 
Salomone's argument persuasive, but, even the unpersuaded should 
be struck by the dynamicism of the equal educational opportunity 
doctrine. 
C. Factors Informing Single-Sex Schooling's Future 
Private single-sex schooling will continue to inform the future of 
public single-sex schooling. Unlike most other scholarly treatments of 
single-sex schooling, Professor Salomone understands that public and 
private school markets do not operate in isolation and that both 
sectors interact in important ways. Amid all the public and scholarly 
mudslinging over education's gender battles, interest in single-sex 
schooling continues to grow. Due to the legal uncertainty surrounding 
public single-sex schools, private schools have responded to the 
increased demand while public schools have balked.68 During a single 
school year (1998-99), enrollment in all-girls elementary and 
secondary schools rose by 4.4 % (p. 5). During the course of a single 
decade, applications to all-girls schools increased by 37%, and 
enrollment by 29%. In New York City, with its high concentration of 
private schools, application to all-girls schools increased by 69%. All­
boys schools enjoyed a similar, though less dramatic, surge, rising by 
more than 16% (p. 5). The implication of the recent growth in interest 
in single-sex private schools on the public single-sex schooling debate 
is indirect, but nonetheless profound. Those with the economic ability 
to exit public for private schools exhibit an increasing preference for 
single-sex schooling options. Should the ability to act on such a 
preference be limited only to those families that can afford private 
schools? If not, then why should a similar education option not be 
made available to those who attend public schools? 
In addition to accommodating individual preferences for single-sex 
schooling, problems with public school systems will also inform 
debates about single-sex schooling. A growing crisis of confidence 
continues to hamstring too many public school districts. In some 
districts, particularly those serving minority children from low-income 
households, confidence crises gave way long ago to educational 
meltdowns.69 Data from the 1989-90 school year in Detroit paint a 
distressing yet hauntingly familiar picture. Single mothers raise 70% of 
68. Despite legal uncertainty, the number of public single-sex schools (or classroom 
experiences) continues to rise as well. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
69. For a fuller discussion see, for example, Ryan & Heise, supra note 44. 
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Detroit's public schoolchildren. More than one half of the African­
American boys, as compared to 45% of the girls, dropped out of 
school. Among those students that persevered to graduation, only 
39% were boys. African American boys also accounted for more than 
66% of the district's short-term suspensions and 67% of those who 
received special services for substance abuse, mental health problems, 
or special education services (p. 132). Although the situation in 
Detroit might be especially dire, it remains emblematic of many urban 
school districts' struggles.70 Thus, whatever one may think about the 
merits of the Detroit School Board's proposal to establish all-boy, all­
African American schools, it is difficult to challenge the Board's and 
public's legitimate sense that an educational disaster has arrived in 
Detroit and that drastic steps are both warranted and necessary to 
solve the problem. Economic circumstances preclude private school 
options of any variety for most families zoned for Detroit's public 
schools. For these kids and their families, public schools are their only 
alternative. Consequently, the public response to the single-sex (and 
single-race) schooling initiative was "overwhelming," as the district 
received more than twice the number of applications than they could 
accommodate (p. 132). 
Present efforts to reform schools and restructure education will 
also inform single-sex education. Of particular note is that during the 
past few decades the most significant reform efforts in education have 
addressed governing structures and institutions and the way 
educational services are both generated and delivered.71 Efforts to 
reform public schooling now embrace market forces to a degree 
unheard of even twenty years ago.72 Specifically, choice - both public 
school choice and school voucher programs - has redefined the 
educational reform landscape. For any version of school choice to 
make sense, options and variations need to exist. Challenges to the 
"one best system"73 continue to mount. Thus, Salomone's argument 
that single-sex schools contribute to the overall diversity of 
educational offerings and enhance school choice parallels a broader 
push for reform seeking to diversify the educational system and make 
70. For a fuller discussion see Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2103-08. 
71. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2050-51 (noting the three substantial efforts to 
reform education and increase educational opportunity include school desegregation, 
finance, and choice). 
72. See Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 261-62 
(1999) (discussing the explosion of an array of school choice options such as magnet and 
charter schools). 
73. See generally DAVID B. TY ACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM (1974). 
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it more responsive to the heterogeneous needs of the increasingly 
heterogeneous population it serves.74 
Legislative and research activity will influence single-sex 
schooling's progress. The federal government's posture in the 
elementary and secondary education setting changed dramatically 
with the recent enactments of Goals 2000 and the No Child Left 
Behind Act.75 The No Child Left Behind Act contains a provision 
targeted toward experimentation in single-sex classes as well as single­
sex schools.76 The Bush Administration also expressed its desire for 
the Department of Education to construe Title IX in a manner that 
would permit local districts more legal latitude in experimenting with 
education policies.77 Such legislative initiatives could provide 
educational policymakers with much-needed momentum for exploring 
single-sex schooling options. 
As well, related federal research appropriations could supply 
much-needed financial support for research efforts needed, in part, to 
generate data upon which a legal defense for single-sex schooling can 
partly rest. As previously discussed, part of single-sex schooling's legal 
exposure flows from the relative paucity of germane data assessing 
single-sex schooling's efficacy.78 Data that exist do not provide 
definitive answers. Federal research funding targeted at single-sex 
schooling could supplement the research foundation that could, in 
tum, inform legal analyses of single-sex schooling. 
CONCLUSION 
It is with no absence of irony that the fate of boys' education may 
shape the future of single-sex schooling generally and, therefore, 
influence the fate of all-girls' schools. Although the clear thrust of the 
modem single-sex schooling movement dwells on girls and all-girls 
schools, Salomone notes a growing concern with the challenges boys 
confront in school. Part of the increased attention to boys' educational 
needs is due to boys' unique circumstances. Another part of the story 
is comparative. Specifically, emerging data now suggest that girls and 
74. Professor Salomone notes (and implicitly supports) the Department of Education's 
Office for Civil Rights' recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking comment upon the 
policy question considering whether single-sex schooling can encourage local innovation, 
expand parental (school) choice, increase educational diversity, and promote equal 
educational opportunity (p. 175). 
75. See supra Part III.A. 
76. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1001, 115 Stat. 1425 
(2001). 
77. See Diana J. Schemo, White House Proposes New View of Education Law to 
Encourage Single-Sex Schools, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2002, at A26. 
78. See supra Part II.A. 
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women are beginning to outperform boys and men in academic areas 
where males held a long advantage.79 Of course, one explanation for 
this trend is that rather than a decrease in male academic 
performance, females are only now just beginning to recover from 
generations of education discrimination. Regardless of the 
explanation, these data help focus attention on males' education needs 
and on whether single-sex schooling might be able to assist. 
The possibility that boys' educational fates might drive the legal 
and policy efficacy of all-girls schools risks playing into some 
feminists' deepest fears: that girls' interest in single-sex education can 
become a policy reality only after it becomes clear that single-sex 
schooling advances boys' interests as well.80 On the other hand, 
perhaps it is of some consolation that feminists supporting all-girls 
schools can cast their interest across genders and leverage interest in 
all-boys schools to their benefit. Whether such a result ameliorates or, 
paradoxically, deepens the gender paradox remains unclear. Such a 
bittersweet pill for feminists principally concerned with the 
educational fate of girls and women and the possibility that their 
educations continue to be shortchanged in traditional coeducation 
settings might be a necessary cost along the way. But if the political 
cost of securing legal protection for all-girls schooling is the 
simultaneous creation of all-boys schools, given that the realization of 
our children's full academic potential is at stake, the cost is probably 
worthwhile. 
79. Two recent developments illustrate. First, in many industrialized nations, women are 
beginning to graduate from post-secondary institutions in numbers that exceed men. See 
Alaina S. Potrikus, Knight-Ridder Washington Bureau, Report Shows Academic 
Achievement Gap Between Girls, Boys (Sept. 19, 2003), at http://www.thatsracin.com/mld/ 
krwashington/news/nation/6814183.htm. At the post-graduate level, for the first time in 
history women applicants to American medical schools exceeded male applicants. See More 
Women Aspiring to be Doctors (Dec. 8, 2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2003/EDUCATION/ 
12/08/medical.school.ap/index.html. 
80. As previously discussed, the empirical evidence of potential benefits flowing from 
single-sex schooling is murky at best. However, Salomone is careful to note that the weight 
of existing evidence provides some basic support for three general propositions. First, single­
sex schooling does not appear to harm students. Second, on balance, girls more than boys 
appear to benefit from single-sex schooling. Third, benefits to boys from single-sex schooling 
are more likely for boys from minority and low-income households (p. 235). 
